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SYMPOSIUM ON GLOBALIZATION AT THE MARGINS: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION FROM DEVELOPING STATES: Globalization and Civil Society-Continuities, Ambiguities, and Realities in Latin America

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TEXT:

[*269] INTRODUCTION

It is a truism of contemporary international political studies that globalization is becoming an increasingly potent force in political life, and nowhere is this increase more apparent than in the established political systems of Latin America. Walking down any street in any Latin American town, one is confronted with the lived reality of globalization; illegal street vendors sell cheap goods made in the Far Eastern Free Trade Zones; teenagers wear "Chicago Bulls" baseball hats; shops blare the music of U2, Guns 'n' Roses, and Gloria Estefan; and German backpackers buy "authentic" trinkets from a woman with a long black plait hanging down to her many-layered skirts. All this occurs alongside the distribution of baby bottles by the United Nations Children's Fund, the leafleting of passers-by as part of the voter education program funded by the Ford Foundation for Democracy, or the hammering sound coming from the nearby construction site of a community health center, courtesy of the Swedish government.

The patterns of connection and enmeshing that this vignette conjures are complex and give us an idea, if not a quantifiable measure, of what globalization means to ordinary people. The most obvious manifestation of globalization is the neo-liberal economic revolution that is occurring at a pace and in ways that are beyond the control of one actor or institution. As such, much of the literature on globalization tends to focus on changes in the structure of international financial patterns or trade, n1 on the activities and [*270] policies of the major financial institutions, n2 and on the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy that they advocate, n3 as well as the development of transnational economic entities that are free from national responsibilities or are outside the jurisdiction of governments. n4 Those who focus on political changes point to the concentration of power in those countries that dominate the economic sphere, n5 the erosion of governmental power over domestic policy (especially in poorer countries), as well as the development of international law and the United Nations as centers for global political contestation. n6 Such developments are intimately linked to the central ideological concept of [*271] liberalism and its contemporary manifestation as the twin phenomena of structural adjustment and formal political liberalization. n7

Globalization can be understood as a set of processes, trends, and socioeconomic outcomes. My focus, though, is on the *ideological* package that is promoted by those processes and that infuses them. This package is called "neo-liberalism." Here, I follow the lead of Peter Wilkin's arguments that globalization is a neo-liberal phenomenon and that the central notion driving globalization is that freedom is "*essentially* and *naturally* about the deepening and widening of private power." n8 As such, the enmeshing and expansion of

global relationships are intimately linked not only to the economic and financial developments that we associate with globalization, but also to the ideas and concepts that neo-liberal globalization promotes and, indeed, by which globalization is promoted. These ideas and concepts are: the free, rapid, and unburdened exchange of money, goods, or information; the radical equality of all actors (sex, race, and location are irrelevant) who have access to the means of engagement (be it capital, a web-site, or an airline ticket); the rejection of the State; and the celebration of "private sector" initiatives as more authentic and better able to promote diversity.

We can identify neo-liberal discourse in the pronouncements of international agencies and in the actions of transnational operators, but this Article focuses on the transmission of such ideas, perceptions, and self-perceptions to ordinary Latin American citizens. In this sense, I look at changes in the culture of Latin American polities, not in terms of the more obvious cultural manifestations of clothes or music, but in relation to a new cultural understanding promoted by the spread of neo-liberalism. I argue that it is at the level of "common sense" understandings and perceptions that deep changes occur. I examine in particular the activities of groups within civil society, showing how social movements have developed and adapted to the exigencies of globalizing liberalism. In doing so, I do not argue that a revolution has taken place; but, that people and organizations have adapted their ideas and activities in recent times, and as such, that significant [*272] continuities and ambiguities can be identified. In the final section, I focus on the expanding role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in facilitating the promotion of neo-liberal understandings and argue that it is they who make neo-liberalism bearable and possible. NGOs are most actively promoting neoliberal values, yet, paradoxically, they are simultaneously promoting a participatory impulse that may defy the elitism of neo-liberal political structures in Latin America.

I. LATIN AMERICA'S LIBERAL CONTEXT

Latin America offers the student of globalization an intriguing arena for the analysis of phenomena and testing of hypotheses. The region suffers from high levels of poverty, patchy patterns of development, massive inequalities of wealth, and high incidences of criminal or informal employment, as do many other "lesser developed" countries. Similarly, problems of migratory displacement, environmental degradation, and the systematic suppression of indigenous people and their cultures form a familiar social backdrop of the "Third World." However, unlike Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, the countries of Latin America hold much in common with the West. They have consolidated territories, clearly defined borders, and low incidences of land-claim or invasion-type conflicts. In addition, they have a relatively long-lived independent political history stretching, in most cases, to the mid-1820s. What is perhaps most striking, in contrast to other "Third World" countries, is the clear predominance of liberalism as the central ideological principle. n10 I do not claim that Latin American polities are embodiments of liberal values, and I certainly deny that political history in Latin American polities has been democratic and respectful of individual rights. Yet many of their fundamental assumptions and idealized norms are rooted in liberal democratic discourse. When we consider political history in the southern section of the American continent, we see that from a military context based on wars of independence was born a traditional, conservative, political elite rooted in Latin America's landed wealth. Liberal parties emerged as a challenge to oligarchic rule, created by the men (naturally) who were spearheading the capitalist revolution [*273] in the region. This revolution brought with it urbanization, mercantilism, and a larger middle class. n11 So far, the story, though taking place later than in Western Europe, is a familiar one featuring franchise expansion, enhanced civil and contractual rights, the development of parliamentary procedures, and the curtailment of presidential powers. This is not to say that Latin America was Western in its political outlook by 1920. Indeed, very non-liberal modes of political interaction were, and in many places still are, prevalent, such as clientelism, populism, repressive conservatism, and semi-feudal patronage politics. However, a veneer and a rhetoric of liberalism persisted and became familiar. Constitutions were drawn up to mirror those of the United States (with a dash of French revolutionary *fraternite* and *egalite*), and formal electoral procedures were utilized even by the military as a way to legitimize and strengthen a leader's claim to power. In short, the experience of liberalism in Latin America has deep roots in striking contrast to other "Third World" countries.

Such experience is not only resonant within the upper political echelons of the polity; liberalism has meaning for many sectors of the lower classes too. The period of industrial and manufacturing expansion, which occurred as a reaction to the world depression of the 1930s, and the opportunities afforded by the advent of war in Europe, led to the emergence of new political actors and parties, including populists,

Christian democrats, communists, and socialists. Liberal values were perpetuated through the extension of the franchise to the poor and to women and through the adoption of welfare policies based on a discourse of socioeconomic rights that mirrored the reconfiguration of liberalism in Western polities in the post-war period. n12 Other "Third World" countries were, meanwhile, struggling to rid themselves of the colonizers, to imagine themselves as "nations," to adapt, adopt, or invent political systems, to create communities of political opinion, and to appropriate a (liberal) language and political system that had no experiential roots in the lives of the ordinary citizens of these new polities. In this sense, [*274] then, Latin America was already inserted into earlier waves of globalizing influence based on the spread of federalist principles and liberal ideas, as well as the nineteenth century expansion of capitalism. It makes sense historically, ideologically, and in people's own lives; yet Latin America is, in common with its "Third World" counterparts, not in control of the dominant discourse or the ideological or financial engines of globalization.

The specific object of study in this Article is "civil society." n13 As a region that has undergone a transition towards democracy in the last twenty years, the presence and role of civil society has been expanding dramatically because of two contradictory, yet complementary, dynamics. These dynamics include the mobilization of ordinary people as advocates of a democratic political system (social movements), and the utilization of private entities, such as NGOs, in accordance with the neo-liberal strategy that promotes the use of social organizations in the solution of social and economic problems. These two dynamics are central to the story of globalization and liberalization; even though rooted in opposed traditions, the two meet in the social arena to produce a whole range of results and relationships that are broadly classified as the operation of civil society. n14

Such developments have been encouraged, in part by the expansion of international linkages between movements in the north and south, to create transnational social movements, especially in relation to "global" issues such as the environment. n15 Also, social organizations have utilized the virtual infrastructure of the Internet to foster the fabrication of more dense patterns of connection and to expand knowledge and support for their causes. Typically, here, we might think of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, [*275] Mexico. There is little doubt that a "global" civil society is emerging. n16 Some authors view this new globalizing civil society as an important element in creating a plurality of political views, and therefore, a potential opposition to the dominant global actors; n17 others see it as being an essential component in creating a global democracy. n18 Linkages within and between NGOs and the major funding agencies have also reinforced the globalizing trend, and the funding agencies have been instrumental in creating and supporting fledgling groups in an effort to create an indigenous civil society. This proliferation has occurred especially in Africa and Central America, where civil society is currently the major focus of energy, investment, and democratic hope. n19

A. The Social Movement Dynamic

The recent history of Latin American politics has seen the advent of the social movement as a major political actor. Typically, these movements grew up under conditions of dictatorship and focused on a single issue, although participants were often supporters (if not active members) of other social organizations. Examples include human rights groups, women's movements, indigenous rights networks, environmental movements, and shantytown organizations. n20 Essentially, the affiliates were leftward-leaning, and the leaderships of these groups were often drawn from political party activists and [*276] the middle classes. Social movements became key political protagonists in combating military repression, organizing resistance to authoritarian rule, publicizing human rights and other violations being committed by the armed forces, and campaigning for equality founded on gender or race. n21 The cornerstone of such organizations was the daily practice of popular democratic procedures. Typically, decisions were made according to a consensus reached through a process of discussion and negotiation in which everyone would take part, and leadership posts were filled either by rotation or through elections. The watchwords were participation, rights, tolerance, listening, and transparency. n22 These ideals were held to be of value not only in their own right, but also in sharp contrast to the coercion, violence, and exclusion of authoritarian rule-as such, they held symbolic, as well as practical, importance.

During the 1980s, such groups called themselves popular organizations; they acknowledged themselves to be part of a national and international issue movement. They also understood that they were woven into the fabric of a wider national or regional social movement that had a clear mandate to oppose the government and military in their country and to denounce authoritarianism and repression elsewhere. In a

context defined by the Cold War and by supposedly knowable moral absolutes, the social movements ignored the ambiguities of political life and embraced the good-bad dichotomy that, in fairness, did make some sense when torturers occupied the presidential palace. The advent of formal democracy, though, misted the mirror of clarity and heralded a time of confusion, disillusion, and a reassessment of the movements' assumptions and goals. Simultaneously, the newly democratic finance ministries embarked upon (or continued with) structural adjustment, and governments began to articulate neo-liberal interpretations of citizen, government, economy, society, and the global context. Economic and political liberalization arrived together and shared a common view of the future conditioned by the impact of global norms; "popular organizations" thus became reworked in neo-liberal parlance as "civil society."
[*277] *B. The Neo-Liberal Dynamic*

The neo-liberal dynamic that has developed since the late 1970s has a completely opposite location on the politico-ideological spectrum. n23 It is linked to a series of policies and an overarching philosophy that emanated from the radical right, associated with Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan in the West, and General Pinochet in Latin America. A neo-liberal discourse infuses the language of major global institutions, conditions the policies that are prescribed (and indeed vetoed) by them, and forms the ideational foundation for the globalization of information, the notion of "world culture" and transnational news networks. Here, I am interested in discussing just one channel for the diffusion of neo-liberal norms-civil society.

The relationship between neo-liberalism and civil society is overlooked by many analysts who take their cue from neo-liberal theory and rhetoric and focus on the market and individualism. n24 The market requires the components that supply and demand goods, services, and labor act in their own best interests and for their own benefit. Thus, individuals compete with one another in order to maximize their satisfaction, and this competition inevitably puts them in an antagonistic position *vis-a-vis* their neighbors, other workers, and other consumers. In contrast, the idea of civil society is rooted in notions of solidarity, altruism, and combining forces to achieve goals, conjuring images of charity events or civic associations. Are people individuals, or can they function as a community? How is it that solidarity and individualism can be combined?

Here, we need to return to the principles of neo-liberal freedom. The essence of freedom for neo-liberals is to be able to do what one wants without recourse to coercion and to be as free as possible to decide what one wills, desires, or believes to be correct: I can do as I wish, so long as I do not impinge on the freedom of others *without their consent*. n25 However, there are plenty of areas where we may well agree with the suggestion of a neighbor or find common cause with another citizen; although putting that idea into action may well imply the need for compromise, we might view the end result as [*278] presenting a greater good (to ourselves) than the loss of a modicum of freedom. For example, resisting the establishment of a rubbish dump at the end of the street, in conjunction with proposing the reclamation of this wasteland and construction of a children's playground, presents an opportunity for the realization of a "selfish" goal that requires us to act in concert with others. The result might not accord with our ideal outcome, and it may well oblige us to give up our time and expend our energies (thus restricting our freedom). Nonetheless, as rational actors geared towards the optimization of our "utopias," we may believe that the sacrifice is worth the effort in the long run. This rational sacrifice is the foundation for the establishment of a neo-liberal civil society, in which individual actors residing in society freely choose to compromise their freedom for a perceived greater long-term benefit.

Such a concept of civil society also accords with the demands of neo-liberals in an ideological sense. Social organizations composed of freely associated individuals are private entities just as much as businesses, for they are open to challenges for position, hegemony, or funding from other similarly constituted organizations. They compete with these organizations through mechanisms of the supply of social goods and respond to a demand that emanates from the desires and needs of individuals and communities in a market not composed of prices, commodities, and wages, but of values, projects, and human resources. They are autonomous of government (though they may choose to work with entities such as municipalities) and answer to those who constitute their membership (who have agreed to forego their modicum of freedom) by effectively providing solutions or other goods such as companionship, the incidental learning of new skills, or personal satisfaction.

Within such an understanding of civil society, NGOs occupy a conceptual space between social organizations and business enterprises. For example, NGOs that train women to become self-employed

hairdressers or pastrymakers must act as businesses in relation to external actors such as funding bodies or the State. n26 They must demonstrate efficiency, probity, and financial soundness in their role as the implementers of policies sponsored by the State, aid organizations, or international NGOs; they compete to take on such a role through a system of project funding through competitive tendering. However, their relationship to the body of clients they intend to service is seldom [*279] motivated purely by economic reasoning, as almost by definition, NGOs are non-profit organizations. Their motives, rather, are based on a sense of moral purpose founded on a desire to help those less fortunate, as well as on an emotive bond of solidarity with a group of people with whom they sense an affinity or for whom they feel a responsibility. As such, NGOs respond to two sets of actors: (1) those who provide finance (in which case the actors must prove their social and economic value and efficiency); and (2) those whose interests are central to their task (by exercising fairness, understanding, and moral probity, as well as by providing an effective and meaningful service). The identity of the NGO, therefore, forces it to cultivate two identities, and often the constraints or impulses that each impose or prompt may frequently come into conflict.

Essentially, the dilemmas faced by NGOs working in the field crystallize around the crucial difference between the vision of social movements and the neo-liberal concept of civil society. Social movements have a political agenda. Neo-liberal civil society has social and essentially practical aims. While social movement activists understand that their activities are rooted in their desire to change the world rather than improve their own backyard, neoliberalism's "non-political" approach is nevertheless political. It responds to ideological impulses and translates them, through civil society, into actions which have particular political repercussions.

C. Social Movements, NGOs, and Globalization

These essentially political divisions are also mirrored in organizations located at the international level. Taking human rights as an example, we might compare and contrast "leftward-leaning" groups, such as Human Rights Watch, with the more conservative and increasingly neo-liberal organizations, such as Freedom House or the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Naturally, each tends to work with its ideological counterpart in the field. The influence of such organizations has been substantial for many years now, but it has tended to be concentrated upon lobbying Western governments, exposing violations of rights at the international level, or applying pressure to [*280] authoritarian regimes. n27 Indeed, both Freedom House and the NED were heavily involved in promoting democracy alongside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in countries such as Nicaragua and Chile and were actively engaged in providing ideological information, training, and funding for prodemocracy projects. n28

With the advent of formal democracy and the intensification of the globalizing dynamic, linkages between north and south have become more dense in terms of the interchange of ideas and the flow of finance. Movements construct themselves on this web and gather adherents from across the world, while NGO activists, who are sufficiently professional, connected, and organized, participate in conferences in Miami or Mexico City. Popular organizations too often have strong international connections. During the dictatorships, solidarity organizations operated in Western countries and were supported both politically, and often financially, by the raising and remittance of donations (e.g., the Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign in the United Kingdom). Another major source of connections comes through exile communities that maintain strong links with the "homeland" and often sponsor pro-democracy initiatives financially and politically (e.g., the Nicaraguan communities of Miami who fled Sandinista Nicaragua).

The globalization of civil society identified by many scholars has, however, created a qualitatively different phenomenon. The former organizations were founded on a political commitment based on lived experience, emotional responses, and moral positions. Increasingly, such organizations are fading into the background (e.g., Westerners turn their attention to Rwanda or Bosnia while exiles return home) and are being replaced by more business-like organizations staffed by Western, professional development experts who-though they are often motivated by political commitment-are nevertheless career-oriented. Such changes have, of course, been encouraged by developments in the allocation of international financial aid and the globalization of communications media. They also align with the neo-liberal concepts of emphasis on "private" initiative rather than public [*281] donation and the allocation of morally-laden goods through the most efficient (and thus morally superior) mechanisms. These concepts are combined with intellectual ideas of free interaction and the exchange of ideas and experiences (mirroring the market), plus concepts of people's equal value and the profound inherent dignity associated with neo-liberalism. This facilitating global

climate, with the increasing density of connections between the donor and recipient regions, is the third element in our analysis of the role of civil society in promoting neo-liberal values among ordinary Latin American citizens.

II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LIFE AT THE GRASSROOTS

It might appear that the two dynamics emanating from social movements and from neo-liberal civil society would lead to division, opposition, and conflict in the social arena or that a change in discourse from "popular organization" to "civil society" would herald a major change at the base. However, more accurately, we should characterize relations in the social arena as reflecting the gradual molding and adaptation of social movements to the developing ideological context as well as the accommodation of business-like NGOs to the realities and ambiguities of "real" life at the base. This Part explores how the social and political relationships that are associated with social movements have been transformed by political liberalization (democratization) and the development of NGOs. The Part that follows explores these issues in light of globalization's politico-ideological message.

A. *The New Context: Political Liberalization*

The type of restricted, low-intensity, elitist democracy that prevails in Latin America (and, one could easily argue, more generally in the West) actively seeks to exclude the participation of grassroots organizations. n29 This point is imperative because structural adjustment causes hardship and suffering for many people (at least in the short term), and social movements are built on a tradition of representing such sectors and denouncing such problems. In order to avoid demonstrations, disruptions, and serious unrest, [*282] those who implement policies need to construct legitimacy. The dovetailing of political and economic liberalization can be seen as the conscious construction of a regime that diffuses objection to the hardship associated with structural adjustment by maintaining a legal, accountable, and formally responsive government. Thus, structural adjustment requires legitimacy, not coercion, in order to implement successfully difficult economic measures. It is better to buy patience than to force a grudging (and therefore unstable) consent. Such developments create a new institutional context that, while providing relative security for activists, changes the nature of social movement activity. n30

First, the relationship of social movements to the "other" has changed dramatically. Social organizations have greatly enhanced the possibility of interaction with government or State agencies, and the days of simply branding the activities of government and State as being illegitimate and wrong are over. Such governments do have legitimacy bestowed by the (often hard-won) electoral process; provided that the elections were relatively free and fair, social organizations are now placed in the position of having to justify themselves and to "prove" that their claim to legitimacy is higher than the president's. Such difficulties are often compounded by much closer personal relationships to those in power. Often, social activists went on to stand for and be elected to positions of representation either in government or in political parties. Social leaders were also brought in to work in government agencies, such as human rights commissions or women's agencies. The melding of the personal and the political position compromises all concerned: the individuals, who often genuinely attempt to bring the demands and ideas of the grassroots to bear in the decision-making or policy-making process; the social movements, who are forced either to accept the necessary negotiation and middle-ground position of the State or party or to be excluded from access to power; the officers (whether elected or employed by the State), who must choose between institutional or party loyalty and their grassroots comrades; and the State itself, which must at least nod meaningfully in the direction of the social movements to whom the new incumbents owe a debt of political support. n31 From certainty, all must embrace ambiguity in this transition from politics as moral stance to politics as practicable compromise.

[*283] Second, social organizations must also accommodate themselves to the new institutional reality that is defined (more or less) in terms of a return to the rule of law and to a "normalization" of political relationships. Thus, activities that were considered to be legitimate under conditions of authoritarian rule, but that were formally illegal, cannot now be undertaken. For example, "lightening" actions, such as unauthorized demonstrations, the painting of murals on public buildings without a permit, or the staging of "sitins" in the municipal offices or law courts, are no longer sanctionable; movements must find new, institutionalized ways to make their point. This change is necessary not only to avoid the legal consequences, but also to avoid the alienation of support in the wider community. Moreover, the advent of predictable politics also implies the demise of "emergency" political decisionmaking, and issues such as representation and accountability within

organizations come to the fore. Such issues are made more apparent by the need for social organizations to become "legalized." "Legalization" requires that these organizations take on a judicial personality, declare who their officers are, explain how they are elected, present accounts to the membership, and hold at least a few formal meetings.

Political liberalization urges social movements to adopt the procedural trappings of formal liberal democracy, and this creates tensions within organizations, particularly because this formalization conflicts with the spirit of "popular democracy" that they formerly practiced. They seem to have more opportunities to participate, but the nature of that participation is molded and confined by an institutional context that reflects not only liberal norms (rights, representation, and rule of law) but also neo-liberal values such as autonomy, subsidiarity, competition, and apolitical organization in the social sphere. Social movements, therefore, have been hugely influenced by the new institutional context that has obliged them, essentially, to become more professionalized and circumspect in their actions. Such changes are associated with the processes of globalization that prescribe formal democratic institutionalization as the most secure political regime with which to nurture and protect the globalizing financial order and neo-liberal orthodoxy.

B. From Social Movement to NGO

Social organizations were not, however, the passive, malleable objects of liberal democratization. They also rethought their own position and their role both in the new democracies and in the context of globalization. Working at [*284] subsistence income levels and under intense emergency conditions was acceptable during times of political danger and urgency. However, once formal political normality had been reintroduced, many activists either drifted away from social activity to reconstruct their own shattered lives, left the arena in a state of exhaustion and anti-climactic disillusion, or decided to "turn professional" and transform their social organizations into NGOs. It is important to point out that, along with those which transformed themselves from "popular organizations" into NGOs, the advent of formal democracy saw the flowering of many new non-governmental groups. These groups were sometimes set up by returning exiles, (particularly in Nicaragua) or resulted from the splintering of social organizations whose unity buckled under the pressure of the new political conditions. n32 Either way, NGOs have become central actors in the domestic politics of Latin America, particularly in their role as "private" implementers of government policy. As such, NGOs take neo-liberal values to the heart of communities and social issues that once were thought to be the preserve of social movements.

The professionalization associated with NGOs has a subtle, though not insubstantial, impact on the nature of social organizations, and in particular, on the relationships between NGO workers and ordinary people. Once the common cause of fighting "the Generals," "Contras," or "Sandinistas" was formally removed, tensions mounted as differences of opinion, background, and political affiliation began to emerge. This increased hierarchical structuring became formalized with the redefinition of many social organizations such as NGOs. The educated middle classes became "professionals" and "problem solvers" who imparted their knowledge and insights to the "client population," who were "problem bearers." Thus, relationships based on common cause and trust have been subtly transformed by the reemergence of the unequal distribution of power, clout, and human resources, as well as the introduction of a market culture, focusing on value-for-money, the "selling" of solutions, and the right of the consumer to satisfaction. n33

[*285] Such a transformation is intimately linked to the perceptions of Western governments and international agencies, particularly in relation to funding issues. During the dictatorships, those governments, agencies, or solidarity groups that wished to fund pro-democracy initiatives (broadly understood) would donate funds directly to the social organizations involved. Contact was made either directly through personal relationships (often via exile communities) or was mediated through domestic or international NGOs acting as intermediaries. For some actors, such as the Scandinavian governments or solidarity groups, such money was channeled into broadly anti-dictatorship groups or perhaps into more specific projects such as women's health groups or indigenous people's rights groups. For other actors, such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the International Republican Institute, monies were focused towards anti-rebel groups in Central America or mainstream liberal democratic initiatives in the Southern Cone. n34 Either way, funds carried an explicit political tag and the broader issues of Cold War, left-right politics were considered to be at least as important as the financing of the projects concerned. Partly as a result of this tagging, and partly because of the clandestine practices necessary to protest action during this period, considerable leeway was afforded to the domestic recipients, and issues such as accountability, budgeting, and financial planning,

among others, were placed at a low priority while political goals were paramount. Social organizations could often divert funds from one source to another, allowing them to channel money to maintain the day-to-day upkeep of the group or to respond to emergencies (such as the need to get someone out of the country); in Central America, monies were also sometimes diverted to the "war effort."

With the advent of formal democracy, though, funding issues changed dramatically. Essentially, the political aim of the recipient group and political motives of the donor became much less clear-cut. "Democracy" had been achieved and now those who held domestic power were representatives accountable to the electorate. Accountability led to two trends. First, the donors were less willing to give money broadly to "further the struggle for democracy" and began shifting towards the funding of specific projects. Second, governments and larger financial organizations began to give aid to the new, democratic government (legitimate in the eyes of the international [*286] community, and formally, within the domestic political arena) for reallocation to domestic NGOs working in nominated fields, such as education for citizenship, training programs for young people, preventative medicine projects, etc. These changes had the effect of shifting the emphasis away from political activism and towards social development while at the same time giving greater political control to domestic governments. Here, then, we see a paradoxical shift away from international relationships and towards a domestic focus for civil society. n35

What once were politically motivated social organizations have now often become professional NGOs concerned with budgets, performance-related criteria, and the measurement of project success rather than with meeting to discuss the forthcoming demonstration, raising the consciousness of women, or overthrowing the authoritarian government. A tangible change has taken place and it is here, where globalizing liberalism interacts with domestic political change, that a culture based on neo-liberal understandings has its greatest opportunity and potential impact.

III. GLOBALIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

It is plain that the dominant economic orthodoxy in Latin America is based on neo-liberal policies, manifested as structural adjustment, and is underpinned by the values and political structures of Western-style liberal democracy. Across the region, governments are pursuing public spending austerity, privatization, monetary stabilization based on control of inflation, the reorientation of development towards export markets based on primary production, and the development of free trade zones. That this adjustment is inspired by the rhetoric and arguments of a Western economic elite and is enforced by the strictures and demands of the major global financial bodies is also undeniable. What is often overlooked, though, is how these policies are accommodated within countries where poverty and high unemployment are overwhelming obstacles to the acceptance of such policies by substantial sections of the population. It is here that NGOs and the "new civil society" [*287] ethos play their role in promoting the globalizing liberal initiative. n36 They do so in two interconnected ways: (1) by providing practical solutions to socioeconomic problems; and (2) by endorsing or advocating a neo-liberal understanding of political and social life.

A. Civil Society and Social Development

The central problem, in terms of domestic political support that new democratic politicians faced in Latin America, was how to maintain support for their governments while simultaneously enacting policies that would cause hardship and distress to wide sections of the population. Fortunately, however, they could implement social policies that utilized the expanding ranks of NGOs inhabiting an increasingly more crowded civil society. Even more fortunately, this strategy was compatible with the broad neo-liberal ideological thrust and solved one of its least popular consequences. n37

The government's problems were simple: they had to respond to poverty; they had to improve infrastructure; they had to promote education and reskilling; and they had to ensure a healthy workforce and citizenry. Yet, they were simultaneously engaged in privatization and huge public spending cutbacks. The way they could achieve both ends was through the deployment of NGOs that would act to provide such public goods but with the funding of private capital. This solution was clearly facilitated by the channeling of aid via newly democratic governments which could then direct that aid towards specific goals by employing NGOs at the base as implementers of projects answering these specific goals. Thus, the government could make a political impact through social development projects, but it was neither responsible for funding such projects nor positioned directly in the firing line at the base should anything go awry. NGOs were the preferred vehicle not only for such cynical reasons, but also because the drive to diminish the State in favor

of private intervention in social policy made NGOs ideal partners. First, they [*288] fulfill the market criteria of competitiveness by tendering for projects or funds, which (it is argued) ensures that they are efficient and innovative while remaining free from the distortions of patronage. Moreover, NGOs operate in the social sphere and at the local level; as such, they are divorced from the formal political sphere and facilitate the devolution of policy implementation to the lowest point. Thus, they help to fulfill the neo-liberal principle of subsidiarity. n38 For neo-liberals, then, NGOs provide a means of implementing policies in the most efficient manner while maintaining overall policy control at the center, through the identification of policy priorities and the allocation of funding to preferred candidates (while also allowing leeway for the veto of "undesirable organizations").

NGOs are also ideal vehicles for policy implementation from the point of view of many grassroots activists, and this is key to their success. NGO activists are often well-known to the communities in which they work, having built up relationships forged in the crucible of struggle against the dictatorships. These activists know the key protagonists as well as the particular problems of the community, and in turn, they are known and trusted more readily by the community than are "outsiders." Many of the techniques and strategies that they use have been tried and tested in the field, and thus, are likely to produce good results early in the project's trajectory; sometimes the project is a continuation or expansion of initiatives already implemented in the community. Evidently, these benefits also have positive implications for the government; projects that run smoothly reflect favorably on the incumbent leadership. Additionally, governments do not have to waste time training staff or pilot-testing projects; they can start immediately.

During periods of authoritarian rule, social organizations concerned with economic development favored those people vulnerable to structural adjustment by providing them with alternative sources of income and new skills. This provision was undertaken by promoting sustainable development (e.g., hydroponic cultivation of vegetables for community use), small-scale production of foodstuffs (e.g., community bakeries), and the household manufacture of goods for sale (e.g., commonly handmade crafts or artifacts). These initiatives were community-based, often organized as cooperatives, and were understood to have a political role in building solidarity, promoting [*289] participation, and providing a focal point for organization and activism. With the demise of authoritarian rule, the perceived urgency for such overtly political programs waned, and it was not a difficult step for organizations and communities alike to move towards development-oriented initiatives that focused more on individuals and their families in the context of a community. "Community" was recast as a social entity rather than a political powerhouse. People were concerned with reconstructing their own lives, and as structural adjustment led to unemployment and falling incomes, NGOs turned their attention to retraining workers by educating them in new skills. Especially popular were courses that prepared people for self-employment (e.g., as a mechanic or a hairdresser) and taught the prospective entrepreneurs about law, accounting, marketing, and advertising, as well as new trades. Often, projects focused on vulnerable groups such as women, young people, or the long-term unemployed; as such, they were understood to be progressive. They "empower" women to take economic control over their lives; they tackle issues such as drug or alcohol abuse among the young; and they provide new opportunities for men whose traditional areas of employment (manufacturing or industry) were in serious economic decline. Such economic development programs have subtly swapped a rhetoric of political empowerment for a rhetoric of socioeconomic empowerment by educating and equipping people with the skills and organizational tools for coping with the harsh realities of contemporary capitalism. A discourse of political participation has been reworked as a discourse of neo-liberal participation in the market, helping to reinvigorate the national economy and to facilitate the nation's economic success.

Another major concern of "ordinary" people that has been transformed by the neo-liberal logic is community improvement. Poor infrastructure and the lack of facilities have been legacies of authoritarian rule in most of the region's countries and have been specifically targeted for social development by both NGOs and governments. Such development is particularly welladvanced in Chile, where the impetus for local development (e.g., paving roads, improving the provision of essential services, and building community centers) has emerged because of the democratization of local government. n39 [*290] In this case, it is often residents' groups, not NGOs, that undertake the organization of such initiatives. The small scale, limited budget, and parochial ambitions of such projects should not fool us into ignoring the businesslike personas that such community organizations and their leaderships take on. They must analyze their problems, propose solutions, design projects, apply for funding, and compete with other community organizations. Once the project has been realized, the organization must report to the funding body to which

it, along with the community, is accountable. Thus, a neo-liberal civil society functions to provide answers to local problems-answers that are not imposed from above but are generated from below-via organizations that embrace the decentralization of policy implementation and which utilize talents and initiatives that emanate from the community itself. Such local, social, and particularized development initiatives help to promote neo-liberal values and notions such as competition, individualism, and the superior logic of the market. Simultaneously, they answer the needs and ideas of ordinary people, though only, of course, where the tendering for funding is successful.

B. Civil Society and Liberal Democracy

Social movements played a crucial role in transitions to democracy throughout the region of Latin America, and as such, the relationship between movement activism and democratization is an intimate one that is well proven. Of interest here is the examination of the ideological orientation of social movements and NGOs to discern the extent to which they are helping to disseminate specifically neo-liberal understandings of democracy and citizenship.

Central to most processes of democratization were human rights campaigns. These campaigns sought to protect political prisoners from arbitrary arrest, illegal imprisonment, torture, murder, and disappearance while campaigning for the recognition and promotion of human rights. n40 Fundamental to such activities were the concept of the individual and the principle that everyone has the right to life, to be free from torture, to be treated equally before the law, and to be accorded due process. This principle [*291] embodies an understanding of rights that places at its center the inviolability of the individual. As such, movements that were opposed to neo-liberalism actually paved their way (though certainly inadvertently) by firmly establishing the political personality of the individual rights-holder. In challenging the repression meted out by the agents of the State, movements were challenging the "right" of the State to dominate the lives of individual citizens, to mold and engineer their existence, and to claim a "higher" authority over ordinary people. This stance mirrors the fundamental position adopted by neo-liberals who argue that coercion and manipulation by the State in any guise (e.g., through planning or taxation) is equally unjustified. Those politically opposed, therefore, were coincidentally acting in concert. n41

With the advent of formal democracy, a new area of human rights work has emerged that seeks to advance the process of democratization. This area involves education for human rights or democracy. Projects in this area have become a major focus for investment by the Ford Foundation for Democracy, USAID, the international branches of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party of the United States, European governments, and the European Union itself. In the Southern Cone, such organizations developed around democratizing elections in order to teach people how to vote and to encourage them to exercise that vote without fear of repression. n42 In Central America, teaching focuses on the constitution, the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the mechanisms of the rule of law. n43 Indeed, Central America presents an interesting case (with the notable exception of Costa Rica) because some liberal norms, such as the inviolability of private property and a minimal role for the State, have been highly prevalent without having been combined with democracy (as in South America). In Nicaragua, liberal democracy was defined by the Sandinista regime as an empty sham that perpetuated inequalities of power, wealth, and [*292] well-being. Instead, the Sandinistas advocated popular democracy that saw a major role for some sectors (e.g., women and peasants) and communities in the discussion and implementation of policy. Here, those at the forefront of human rights education are drawn (broadly) from the right, and they advocate the principles of a neo-liberal democracy. They place a high premium on procedures (rather than ad hoc groupings), on issues of representation and accountability (rather than "leadership" and "participatory meetings"), and on the dignity of the individual rights-holder. Conversely, in El Salvador, formal democratic procedures are being "taught" and advocated by all manner of groups, including human rights organizations and social action groups associated with the left. This diversification is occurring because El Salvador's history featured political exclusion for the lower sectors, the prevalence of political violence as a means of grievance expression or control, and the systematic distortion and corruption of the means of representation through government and redress via the law. As such, the advent of a rule of law, free and fair elections, and political interaction guided by procedures rather than coercion (e.g., the formal trappings of democracy) have been embraced and heralded by the left as being a "progressive" move that will allow ordinary citizens to become involved in politics, to raise their concerns and voices, and to lay a meaningful claim to the title of citizen. n44

Again, we find that organizations that are ostensibly politically opposite are selling the same story to their clients; that story is one of involvement, dignity, self-determination, and equal human value. Both types of organizations take the values of (neo-)liberalism and interpret them to suit the context, to make sense of history, and to advance their own political objectives. Crucially, also, both have a similar distaste for the State (the *bete noir* of neo-liberalism) and a similar liking for the individual, although for very different reasons. For the right, the object is to counter the bureaucracy, inefficiency, and sheer meddling of the State in people's lives. For the left, the aim is to curb the political power of the government as articulated by the State apparatus, particularly given people's experience of coercion and violence by the agents of the State at the behest of authoritarian and exclusionary governments. Both sides, meanwhile, identify the individual citizen as the central political actor and see in her or him the potential for [*293] enhanced freedom, personal satisfaction, and the creation of a more fairly-run, improved society.

The essential difference, though not often captured by the activists or the communities themselves, is that the neo-liberal option advocates *social participation* in the social sphere and in relation to *socioeconomic* goals. The leftist option, however, promotes *political participation* in the social sphere in relation to *sociopolitical* goals. The difference, therefore, hinges on where power is deemed to be located (in the economy or in the political arena); how that power is best contested (through participation in the market or participation through political interaction); and what is right and proper for the citizen's concern (everything understood to be economic or everything understood to be political). At heart, the divergence relates to what is understood to be driving the power engine: is it economic ingenuity or political will? Such dual interpretations and parallel dynamics have emerged throughout this analysis, and it is to the implications of such ambiguities for the prospects of neo-liberal globalization in Latin America that I turn in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION

The process of globalization is undoubtedly having a major impact on Latin American polities. It is forcing governments, through direct intervention and veto as well as through ideological-rhetorical persuasion, to adopt economic policies that will facilitate the country's integration into the world market. It is advocating, through aid allocation, encouragement, and the promise of favorable treatment, that governments adopt liberal, democratic political systems. While global economic integration finds little resonance amongst the ordinary people of Latin America (given the hardship it entails), aid and other benefits have long been a central demand of citizens who have suffered under violent and exclusionary regimes. The key to the successful integration of Latin American economies into the global free market and their participation in the process of (neo-liberal) globalization is, therefore, the promotion of neo-liberal understandings of the world through the efforts of NGOs in their roles as providers of solutions that are both practical (i.e., socioeconomic development) and pedagogical (i.e., education for democracy).

[*294] Latin America is well placed to "make sense" of the neo-liberal crusade. This is because the fundamental character (the individual), the essential mechanism (the market), and the founding premise (fairness through equality of competition) of liberalism are familiar elements in the game of power. In recent years, social movements and NGOs have also contributed to an understanding of the dignity of the individual, the corruption and iniquitous character of the State, and the empowering satisfaction that can be derived from direct action and the solution of problems at the base.

Latin American governments have had little option but to embrace the structural adjustment demanded by globalizing, neo-liberal economics, and the advent of NGOs has allowed them to accommodate pressures from below. This stability is not an insubstantial benefit given the fragility of many such democracies. Governments have, moreover, set about constructing or consolidating the new democracies according to a liberal (and often neoliberal) blueprint that, again, under the guise of democratization and through the auspices of social-movements-turned-NGOs, has been generally embraced.

Given the above, it appears likely that Latin America will become more deeply, more rapidly, and more intricately linked to the process of globalization. However, globalizing neo-liberalism may have sown the seeds of a new challenge to its meteoric and near hegemonic rise. What brings together and makes compatible the politically opposed dynamics of social movement and neo-liberal civil society is the celebration of self-determination that each espouses. At present, the role of NGOs is crucial in improving the environment and life-chances of ordinary citizens and in building credibility for neo-liberal governments and their policies. However, the urge to participate and the neo-liberal direction of that participation may not

remain compatible forever, and political activism at the base might well re-emerge as a counter-hegemonic force. Indeed, political developments, such as: the impact of democratization; a rhetoric of rights which dignifies the lives and hopes of the individual; the invocation that "individual citizens are important;" the encouragement of organization at the base; the legitimization of government accountability to its citizenry; and the flowering of all kinds of autonomous organizations, could equally be said to encourage grassroots democracy as much as neo-liberalism. Moreover, such a reinterpretation of powerful citizenship might be facilitated by the contemporary development of international norms around human rights, the purposeful intervention of [*295] international agencies in favor of elections, the growing power of international NGOs, and NGOs' greater connection to indigenous partner groups, all of which have developed as part and parcel of globalization. The development of such political sites could provide a "global" home for democratizing initiatives at the base.

Finally, then, it is necessary to emphasize that a specifically neo-liberal globalization will not only depend on the relationships, actions, and strategies of major international actors for its success, but also on the degree to which its policies find resonance with the ordinary people who receive, adapt, remold, accommodate new ideas from above, and who rework their own political culture in the light of such changes. If we are discussing the future of globalizing neo-liberalism, it is essential to understand that domestic politics matter, that the domestic political context can have a favorable or unfavorable impact on neo-liberalism's prospects, and that civil society has a greater role than simply providing retraining, education in democracy, or a new community center. Civil society is engaged in a political project that is molding State-society relationships; that is, changing citizens' understanding of themselves, their role in society, and the role of the State; and that is "making sense" of the socioeconomic changes associated with the globalizing capitalist imperative. Whether this project is always or necessarily a neo-liberal imperative is another matter.

FOOTNOTES:

n1 See ROBERT W. COX, WITH TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, *APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER* 524-36 (1996); *THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN TRANSITION* (P.W. Daniels & William Lever eds., 1996); YORK W. BRADSHAW & MICHAEL WALLACE, *GLOBAL INEQUALITIES* (1996); JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, *THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?: THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD* (1992); *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER* (C. Roe Goddard et al. eds., 1996); RICHARD O'BRIEN, *GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY* (1992).

n2 See PAUL J. NELSON, *THE WORLD BANK AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* (1995); Manuel Pastor, Jr., *The Effects of IMF Programs in the Third World: Debate and Evidence from Latin America*, in *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER*, *supra* note 1, at 247; K. Sarwar Lateef, *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*, in *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER*, *supra* note 1, at 291; TONY KILLICK, *IMF PROGRAMMES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: DESIGN AND IMPACT* (1995); IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, *THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS* 53-202 (1991) (discussing social and political issues in World Bank operations). For a more critical approach to the work of such institutions, see *BEYOND BRETTON WOODS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER* (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1994); Bruce Rich, *World Bank/IMF: 50 Years Is Enough*, in *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER*, *supra* note 1, at 305.

n3 This focus is on structural adjustment. See Steven Gill, *Globalization, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism*, 24 *MILLENNIUM* 399; *THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE* (Stephen Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992); Rosario Espinal, *Development, Neoliberalism and Electoral Politics in Latin America*, *DEV. & CHANGE*, Oct. 1992, at 27. For country-specific examples, see Philip O'Brien, *Authoritarianism and the New Economic Orthodoxy: The Political Economy of the Chilean Regime 1975-1983*, in *GENERALS IN RETREAT: THE CRISIS OF MILITARY RULE IN LATIN AMERICA* 144 (Philip O'Brien & Paul Cammack eds., Manchester Univ. Press 1985); William C. Smith, *State, Market and Neoliberalism in Post-Transition Argentina: The Menem Experiment*, *J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF.*, Winter 1991, at 45.

n4 See, e.g., MARK CASSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION (1992); JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1993) (discussing impacts of multinational corporations); ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND THE STATE (1994) (providing a critical historical account of the development of multinational corporations).

n5 On the western ideological dominance of democratization, see Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, *Globalisation and Inequality*, 24 MILLENNIUM 447 (1995); TONY EVANS, US HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 101-20 (1996); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85-98 (1991). For a general assessment of liberal democracy's spread, see Larry Diamond, *The Globalization of Democracy*, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE THIRD WORLD 31 (Robert O. Slater et al. eds., 1993). On direct investment, see Mark Robinson, *Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The Role of Foreign Political Aid*, IDS BULL., Apr. 1995, at 70.

n6 See, e.g., Mark Imber, *Geo-Governance Without Democracy?: Reforming the UN System*, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY?: GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL DEMOCRACY 201 (Anthony G. McGrew ed., 1997).

n7 Here, structural adjustment is understood to seek open markets, minimal state intervention, and fiscal austerity. See *infra* note 23. Political liberalization focuses on the establishment of institutions and procedures associated with democracy.

n8 Peter Wilkin, *New Myths for the South: Globalization and the Conflict Between Private Power and Freedom*, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH 19 (Caroline Thomas & Peter Wilkin eds., 1997).

n9 See generally Lucy Taylor, *Text-book Citizens: Education for Democracy and Political Culture in El Salvador*, 6 DEMOCRATIZATION (1999) (examining political culture as an element of analysis); Lucy Taylor, *Political Culture and Democratization: Forging Democracy as "Common Sense"* (manuscript on file with author) (presenting a more in-depth discussion about political culture as an element of analysis).

n10 See generally HOWARD J. WIARDA, THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND U.S. POLICY 3-57 (1990); LIBERALS, POLITICS, AND POWER: STATE FORMATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA (Vincent C. Peloso & Barbara A. Tenenbaum eds., 1996); JAIME E. RODRIGUEZ O., THE INDEPENDENCE OF SPANISH AMERICA 75-103 (1998) (discussing early representative government).

n11 See Frank Safford, *Politics, Ideology and Society in Post-Independence Spanish America*, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 347 (Leslie Bethell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984); see also Paul Cammack, *States and Markets in Latin America*, in THE MARKET AND THE STATE 138 (Michael Moran & Maurice Wright eds., 1991) (presenting a brief but incisive review of economic development and its political consequences); Charles A. Hale, *Political and Social Ideas in Latin America, 1870-1930*, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 367 (Leslie Bethell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986).

n12 The literature on this period is vast. For a country-based introduction, see 4 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LATIN AMERICA (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1989). For a general analysis, see E. BRADFORD BURNS, LATIN AMERICA: A CONCISE INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (6th ed. 1994); THOMAS C. WRIGHT, LATIN AMERICA IN THE ERA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (1991).

n13 The theoretical literature on social movements, civil society, and NGOs is vast. See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992) (discussing civil society); JOHN A. HALL, CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON (1995); DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1999); Ana Maria Bejarano, *Democracia y Sociedad Civil: Una Introduccion Teorica*, 15 ANALISIS POLITICA 68 (1992); Craig Calhoun, *Civil Society and the Public Sphere*, 5 PUB. CULTURE 267 (1993); Partha Chatterjee, *A Response to Taylor's "Modes of Civil Society,"* 3 PUB. CULTURE 119 (1990); Charles Taylor, *Modes of Civil Society*, 3 PUB. CULTURE 95 (1990).

n14 See Matthias Finger, *NGOs and Transformation: Beyond Social Movement Theory*, in ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL (Thomas

Princen & Matthias Finger eds., 1994) (theorizing NGOs in relation to social movements); PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSITIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 2-27 (Peter Willets ed., 1982).

n15 See JEAN GRUGEL, *European NGOs and Democratization in Latin America*, in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS: TRANSNATIONALIZATION AND CONDITIONALITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (1999); Kathryn Sikkink, *Human Rights, Principled-Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America*, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993) (examining North-South NGO relations).

n16 See CAMILLERI & FALK, *supra* note 1; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*, 21 MILLENNIUM 389 (1992).

n17 See, e.g., PAUL EKINS, A NEW WORLD ORDER: GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS FOR GLOBAL CHANGE (1992); Richard Falk, *The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time*, 12 ALTERNATIVES 173 (1987); Martin Shaw, *Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach*, 23 MILLENNIUM 647 (1994).

n18 See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 219-86 (1995); see also COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995).

n19 See Fantu Cheru, *New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Human Rights in Africa*, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 145 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); Robinson, *supra* note 5.

n20 Much has been published on Latin American social movements, often focusing on detailed research-based analysis. Two texts which bring together a diversity of issues and movements are POWER AND POPULAR PROTEST: LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Susan Eckstein ed., 1989), and THE MAKING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: IDENTITY, STRATEGY AND DEMOCRACY (Arturo Escobar & Sonia E. Alvarez eds., 1992). For examples on women's issues, see THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Jane S. Jacquette ed., 1989); WOMEN AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA (Elizabeth Jelin ed. & J. Ann Zammit & Marilyn Thomson trans., 1990). On human rights, see REPRESION POLITICA Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (Hugo E. Fruhling ed., 1986); Kathryn Sikkink, *The Emergence, Evolution and Effectiveness of Latin American Human Rights Network*, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA (Elizabeth Jelin & Eric Herschberg eds., 1996). On race issues, see PETER WADE, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN LATIN AMERICA 95-110 (1997).

n21 See LUCY TAYLOR, CITIZENSHIP, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CHANGING DYNAMICS IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA 47-59 (1998).

n22 For an examination of human rights groups, see Jennifer G. Schirmer, *Those Who Die for Life Cannot be Called Dead: Women and Human Rights Protests in Latin America*, FEMINIST REV., Summer 1989, at 3. However, it should be noted that many groups did not live up to such high and often rhetorical ideals.

n23 For key authors of the neo-liberal approach, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1976); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). For a useful introductory discussion of neo-liberalism, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 95-159 (1990).

n24 For a detailed discussion of neo-liberal citizenship, see TAYLOR, *supra* note 21, at 10-30.

n25 See NOZICK, *supra* note 23, at 309-34.

n26 The gendered interpretation of tasks in this example reflects common practice among mainstream Latin American NGOs, not my preferences.

n27 For an assessment of the work of the Human Rights Watch, see WILLIAM KOREY, NGO'S AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: "A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE" 339-67 (1998). For information on Amnesty International, see Martin Ennals, *Amnesty International and Human Rights*, in

PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 63-83 (Peter Willets ed., 1982).

n28 For an account of United States sponsored NGOs in Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Philippines, see WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996). For an analysis of Freedom House and its role in promoting democracy, see KOREY, *supra* note 27, at 443-67; WIARDA, *supra* note 10, at 143-68.

n29 Such authors include JAMES PETRAS & MORRIS MORLEY, LATIN AMERICA IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA: ELECTORAL POLITICS, MARKET ECONOMICS AND PERMANENT CRISIS (1992); Paul Cammack, *Democratisation: A Review of the Issues*, 4 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 39 (1985); Barry Gills & Joel Rocamora, *Low Intensity Democracy*, 13 THIRD WORLD Q. 501 (1992); Timothy M. Shaw & Fahimul Quadir, *Democratic Development in the South in the Next Millennium: What Prospects for Avoiding Anarchy and Authoritarianism?*, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH, *supra* note 8.

n30 I have argued some of the following points in greater detail in Lucy Taylor, *Strangers in Democracy: Problems of Social Movements in the Process of Democratic Consolidation*, in CONTEMP. POL. STUD. 1069 (Joni Lovenduski & Jeffrey Stanyer eds., 1995).

n31 This sort of thing occurred particularly in Chile. See TAYLOR, *supra* note 21, at 93-123.

n32 See *id.* at 135-69.

n33 By no means have all grassroots organizations undergone such a transformation; human rights groups in particular remain strongly bonded to their "client" base through the intensity of emotional investment and the potent linkage between moral and political sentiments. Moreover, professionalization does not necessarily imply cynical manipulation; those middle class professionals who work with the poor or with women retain a strong and genuine commitment to working for the benefit of their "client" communities.

n34 For a detailed and well-informed analysis of NGOs and democratic consolidation, see LAURA McDONALD, SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF NGOS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1997).

n35 See Lucy Taylor, *Market Forces and Moral Imperatives: The Professionalization of Social Activism in Latin America*, in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: TRANSNATIONALISATION AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Lucy Taylor ed., forthcoming 1999).

n36 On the role of social movements toward the consolidation of democracy in Latin America, see Jorge J. Roblero, *Movimientos sociales y concertación social en América Latina*, May 29, 1992, at 167-88; Larry Diamond, *Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation*, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 4 (1994).

n37 See Peter Evans, *Introduction: Development Strategies Across the Public-Private Divide*, 24 WORLD DEV. 1033 (1996). For parallels with African cases, see Alan Fowler, *The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations: Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa*, 9 DEV. POL'Y REV. 53 (1991).

n38 See TAYLOR, *supra* note 21, at 145-52.

n39 See Alex Rosenfeld et al., *La situación de los gobiernos locales en Chile*, in DESCENTRALIZACION Y DEMOCRACIA: GOBIERNOS LOCALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 185-239 (Jordi Borja et al. eds., 1989); see also Jonathan Fox, *Latin America's Emerging Local Politics*, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1994, at 105.

n40 See, e.g., ALISON BRYSK, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA: PROTEST, CHANGE, AND DEMOCRATIZATION (1994); see also REPRESION POLITICA Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (Hugo E. Fruhling ed., 1986).

n41 This argument is also advocated by David Held, who emphasized the common approach to the individual of "left" and neo-liberal theorists. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 293-334 (2d ed. 1996).

n42 Such groups include "Participa" and "Ideas" in Chile and "Poder Ciudadano" and "Conciencia" in Argentina. See Helena Hidalgo, *Estrellita de Belen, tengo que votar y no se por quien*, NUEVOS AIRES

(Proyecto Educacion para la Democracia), Summer 1991, at 20; Maria Ines Ruz, *A quienes y para que se capacita hoy?*, NUEVOS AIRES (Proyecto Educacion para la Democracia), Summer 1991, at 22.

n43 For examples, see "Iniciativa Social por la Democracia" (ISD) and "Comision Permanente por los Derechos Humanos" (CPDH) in El Salvador, and "Centro de Educacion por la Democracia" (CED) and "Hagamos Democracia" in Nicaragua.

n44 I explore such issues in greater depth in Taylor, *supra* note 9.