In the following decision the Supreme Court applies the "standing" requirement to a typical citizen suit provision. We are reading it both to learn about citizen enforcement, standing, and the "Community Right to Know Act." 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

90 F.3d 1237, vacated and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined as to Parts I and IV. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV, and GINSBURG, J., joined as to Part III. GINSBURG, J., [***7] filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

[**1008] [*86] JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a private enforcement action under the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 100 Stat. 1755, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1). The case presents the merits question, answered in the affirmative by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, whether EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. It also presents the jurisdictional question whether respondent, plaintiff below, has standing to bring this action.

I

Respondent, an association of individuals interested in environmental protection, sued petitioner, a small manufacturing company in Chicago, for past violations of EPCRA. EPCRA establishes a framework of state, regional and local agencies designed to inform the public about the presence of hazardous and toxic chemicals, and to provide for emergency response in the event of health-threatening release. Central to its operation are reporting requirements compelling users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to file annual [*87] "emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms" and "toxic [***8] chemical release [**1009] forms," which contain, inter alia, the name and location of the facility, the name and quantity of the chemical on hand, and, in the case of toxic chemicals, the waste-disposal method employed and the annual quantity released into each environmental medium. 42 U.S.C. § § 11022 and 11023. The hazardous-chemical inventory forms for any given calendar year are due the following March 1st, and the toxic-chemical release forms the following July 1st. § § 11022(a)(2) and 11023(a).

Enforcement of EPCRA can take place on many fronts. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the most powerful enforcement arsenal: it may seek criminal, civil, or administrative penalties. § 11045. State and local governments can also seek civil penalties, as well as injunctive relief. § § 11046(a)(2) and (c). For purposes of this case, however, the crucial enforcement mechanism is the citizen-suit provision, § 11046(a)(1), which likewise authorizes civil penalties and injunctive relief, see § 11046(c). This provides that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . an owner or operator of a facility for failure," among other things, to "complete and submit [***9] an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title . . . [and] section 11023(a) of this title." § 11046(a)(1). As a prerequisite to bringing such a suit, the plaintiff must, 60 days prior to filing his complaint, give notice to the Administrator of the EPA, the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator. § 11046(d). The citizen suit may not go forward if the Administrator "has commenced and is diligently pursuing an administrative order or civil action to enforce the requirement concerned or to impose a civil penalty." § 11046(e).

In 1995 respondent sent a notice to petitioner, the Administrator, and the relevant Illinois authorities, alleging -- accurately, as it turns out -- that petitioner had failed since 1988, the first year of EPCRA's filing deadlines, to complete and [*88] to submit the requisite hazardous-chemical inventory and toxic-chemical release forms under § § 11022 and 11023. Upon receiving the notice, petitioner filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies. The EPA chose not to bring an action against petitioner, and when the 60-day waiting period expired, respondent filed suit in Federal District Court. Petitioner promptly [***10] filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), contending that, because its filings were up to date when the complaint was filed, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a present violation; and that, because EPCRA does not allow suit for a purely historical violation, respondent's allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The District Court agreed with petitioner on both points. App. to Pet. for Cert. A24-A26. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that citizens may seek penalties against EPCRA violators who file after the statutory deadline and after receiving notice. 90 F.3d 1237 (CA7 1996). We granted certiorari, 117 S. Ct. 1079, 137 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1997).

II

[This section is devoted to an attack on Justice Stevens' argument that the question of whether EPCRA allows citizen suits against wholly past violations is a jurisdictional question that could as well be resolved before proceeding as the standing question. Justice Scalia concludes for a bare majority that the question of Article III standing must be resolved before the statutory question.]

. . .

III

In addition to its attempt to convert the merits issue in this case into a jurisdictional one, JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence proceeds (post, at 7-13) to argue the bolder point that jurisdiction need not be addressed first anyway. Even if the statutory question is not "framed . . . in terms of 'jurisdiction,'" but is simply "characterized . . . as whether respondent's complaint states a 'cause of action,'" "it is also clear that we have the power to decide the statutory question first." Post, at 7. This is essentially the position embraced by several Courts of Appeals, which find it proper to proceed immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were [***20] jurisdiction denied. See, e.g., SEC v. American [*94] Capital Investments, Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1139-1142 (CA9 1996), cert. denied, Shelton v. Barnes, 137 L. Ed. 2d 681, 117 S. Ct. 1468 (1997); Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 108 (CA11 1996); Clow v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 948 F.2d 614, 616, n. 2 (CA9 1991); Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC, 290 U.S. App. D.C. 39, 934 F.2d 327, 333 (CADC 1991); United States v. Parcel of Land, 928 F.2d 1, 4 (CA1 1991); Browning-Ferris Industries v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 154-159 (CA2 1990). The Ninth Circuit has denominated this practice -- which it characterizes as "assuming" jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits -- the "doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction." See, e.g., United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934, n. 1 (1996). . . .

We decline to endorse such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.  . . .

IV

Having reached the end of what seems like a long front walk, we finally arrive at the threshold jurisdictional question: whether respondent, the plaintiff below, has standing to sue. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extends the "judicial Power" of the United States only to "Cases" and "Controversies." We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to and resolved by the judicial process. Muskrat v. United States, supra, 219 U.S. 346 at 356-357. Such a meaning is fairly implied by the text, since otherwise the purported restriction upon the judicial power would scarcely be a restriction at all. Every criminal investigation conducted by the Executive is a "case," and every policy issue resolved by congressional legislation involves a "controversy." These are not, however, the sort of cases and controversies that Article III, § 2, refers to, since "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts." Lujan v. Defenders [***34] of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-560, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).

The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" contains three requirements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560. [*103] First and foremost, there must be alleged [***35] (and ultimately proven) an "injury in fact" -- a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Whitmore v. Arkansas, supra, at 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983)). Second, there must be causation -- a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's [**1017] injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). And third, there must be redressability -- a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Id., at 45-46; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975). This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability  comprises the core of Article III's case-or-controversy [*104] requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).

. . .

[R]espondent asserts petitioner's failure to provide EPCRA information in a timely fashion, and the lingering effects of that failure, as the injury in fact to itself and its members. We have not had occasion to decide whether being deprived of information that is supposed to be disclosed under EPCRA -- or at least being deprived of it when one has a particular plan for its use -- is a concrete injury in fact that satisfies Article III. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 578. And we need not reach that question in the present case because, assuming injury in fact, the complaint fails the third test of standing, redressability. The complaint asks for (1) a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA; (2) authorization to inspect periodically petitioner's facility and records (with costs borne by petitioner); (3) an order requiring petitioner to provide respondent copies of all compliance reports submitted to the EPA; (4) an order requiring petitioner to pay civil penalties of $ 25,000 per day for each violation of § § 11022 and 11023; (5) an award of all respondent's "costs, in connection with the investigation and prosecution [***39] of this matter, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, as authorized by Section 326(f) of [EPCRA]"; and (6) any such further relief as the court deems appropriate. App. 11. None of the specific items of relief sought, and none that we can envision as "appropriate" under the general request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by the late reporting, [*106] or to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.

 . . . .

The first item, the request for a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA, can be disposed of summarily. There being no controversy over whether petitioner failed to file reports, or over whether such a failure constitutes a violation, the declaratory judgment is not only worthless to respondent, it is seemingly worthless to all the world. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 479, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400, 110 S. Ct. 1249 (1990). Item (4), the civil penalties authorized by the statute, see § 11045(c), might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable to respondent. But they are not. These penalties -- the only damages authorized by EPCRA -- are payable to the United States Treasury. In requesting them, therefore, respondent seeks not remediation of its own injury -- reimbursement for the costs it incurred as a result of the late filing -- but vindication of the rule of law -- the "undifferentiated public interest" in faithful execution of EPCRA. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 577; see also Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-130, 66 L. Ed. 499, 42 S. Ct. 274 (1922). This does not suffice. JUSTICE STEVENS thinks it is enough that respondent will be gratified [***41] by seeing petitioner punished for its infractions and that the punishment [*107] will deter the risk of future harm. Post, at 17-18. If that were so, our holdings in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536, 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976), are inexplicable. Obviously, such a principle would make the redressability requirement vanish. By the [**1019] mere bringing of his suit, every plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a favorable judgment will make him happier. But although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the nation's laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754-755, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-483, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability [***42] requirement. Item (5), the "investigation and prosecution" costs "as authorized by Section 326(f)," would assuredly benefit respondent as opposed to the citizenry at large. Obviously, however, a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The litigation must give the plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct of the litigation itself. An "interest in attorney's fees is . . . insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. at 480 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71, 90 L. Ed. 2d 48, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986)). Respondent asserts that the "investigation costs" it seeks were incurred prior to the litigation, in digging up the emissions and storage information that petitioner should have filed, and that respondent needed for its own purposes. See Brief for Respondent 37-38. The recovery of such expenses unrelated [*108] to litigation would assuredly support Article III standing, but the problem is that § 326(f), which is the entitlement to monetary relief that the complaint invokes, covers [***43] only the "costs of litigation."  § 11046(f). Respondent finds itself, in other words, impaled upon the horns of a dilemma: for the expenses to be reimbursable under the statute, they must be costs of litigation; but reimbursement of the costs of litigation cannot alone support standing.

The remaining relief respondent seeks (item (2), giving respondent authority to inspect petitioner's facility and records, and item (3), compelling petitioner to provide respondent copies of EPA compliance reports) is injunctive in nature. It cannot conceivably remedy any past wrong but is aimed at deterring petitioner from violating EPCRA in the future. See Brief for Respondent 36. The latter objective can of course be "remedial" for Article III purposes, when threatened injury is one of the gravamens of the complaint. If respondent had alleged a continuing violation or the imminence of a future violation, the injunctive relief requested would remedy that alleged harm. But there is no such allegation here -- and on the facts of the case, there seems no basis for it. Nothing supports the requested injunctive relief except respondent's generalized interest in deterrence, [*109] which is insufficient for purposes of Article III. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. The United States, as amicus curiae, argues that the injunctive relief does constitute remediation because "there is a presumption of [future] injury when the defendant has voluntarily ceased its illegal activity [***45] in response to litigation," even if that [**1020] occurs before a complaint is filed. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28, and n. 11. This makes a sword out of a shield. The "presumption" the Government refers to has been applied to refute the assertion of mootness by a defendant who, when sued in a complaint that alleges present or threatened injury, ceases the complained-of activity. See, e.g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 97 L. Ed. 1303, 73 S. Ct. 894 (1953). It is an immense and unacceptable stretch to call the presumption into service as a substitute for the allegation of present or threatened injury upon which initial standing must be based. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, supra, at 109. To accept the Government's view would be to overrule our clear precedent requiring that the allegations of future injury be particular and concrete. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-497, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974). "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id., at 495-496; see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320, 115 L. Ed. 2d 288, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991) ("The [***46] mootness exception for disputes capable of repetition yet evading review . . . will not revive a dispute which became moot before the action commenced"). Because respondent alleges only past infractions of EPRCA, and not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury.

* * *

Having found that none of the relief sought by respondent would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, we must conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit, [*110] and that we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it. However desirable prompt resolution of the merits EPCRA question may be, it is not as important as observing the constitutional limits set upon courts in our system of separated powers. EPCRA will have to await another day.

The judgment is vacated and the case remanded with instructions to direct that the complaint be dismissed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, concurring.

. . . As the Court notes, ante, at 24, had respondent alleged a continuing or imminent violation of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 100 Stat. 1755, 42 U.S.C. § 11046, the requested injunctive relief may well have redressed the asserted injury.

. . . I write separately to note that, in my view, the Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under which federal courts may exercise judgment in "reserving difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction when the case alternatively [***48] [*111] could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party," Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 672, 96 S. Ct. 2771 (1976).

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the respondent in this case lacks Article III standing. I further agree that federal courts often and typically should decide standing questions at the outset of a case. That order of decision (first jurisdiction then the merits) helps better [**1021] to restrict the use of the federal courts to those adversarial disputes that Article III defines as the federal judiciary's business. But my qualifying words "often" and "typically" are important. The Constitution, in my view, does not require us to replace those words with the word "always." The Constitution does not impose a rigid judicial "order of operations," when doing so would cause serious practical problems.

. . .

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins as to Parts I, III, and IV, and with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins as to Part III, concurring in the judgment.

This case presents two questions: (1) whether the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq., confers federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations; and (2) if so, whether respondent has standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court has elected to decide the constitutional question first and, in doing so, has created new constitutional law. Because it is always prudent to avoid passing unnecessarily on an undecided constitutional question, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348, 80 L. Ed. 688, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), the Court should answer the statutory question first. Moreover, because EPCRA, properly construed, does not confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations, the Court should leave the constitutional [***51] question for another day.

. . . [extensive remainder of opinion omitted

Important Note. In a case decided in January, 2000, the Supreme Court greatly reduced the effect of this ruling, by upholding the right of a citizen group to maintain a suit for a violation of the Clean Water Act which was remedied after the suit was filed, but before judgment was given. The court also held that civil damages can redress harms to citizens by creating a deterrent effect against future violations. That decision, which we have not read because it is somewhat more technical than the above one and involves an extended discussion of mootness, is Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000)